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SOUL SEARCHING AND THE SPIRIT OF 
SHARI‘A: A REVIEW OF BERNARD WEISS’S  
THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 
THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW. By Bernard G. Weiss. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1998.  Pp. 211. 
Reviewed by Khaled Abou El Fadl* 
Islamic law is one of the most complex and influential legal systems the 
world has known, but it is one of the most understudied, oversimplified, and 
overgeneralized systems as well. Although there is a virtual dearth of 
sophisticated studies on Islamic law, scholars from two distinct persuasions, 
the Muslim fundamentalist and Western orientalist, have produced a large 
number of books in which they make sweeping (and largely unfounded) 
generalizations about the history and nature of Islamic law. Scholars from 
these two persuasions have contributed to the oversimplification of the 
Islamic legal tradition to the point that Islamic law today fails to attract the 
attention of serious scholars of comparative law. This, in part, is because both 
fundamentalists and orientalists have failed to give Islamic law its due as a 
legal system that is a product of a technical legal culture and practice. Rather, 
they have treated Islamic law as a branch of Islamic theology and, 
consequently, tended to see Islamic law as idealistic, speculative, and, to a 
large extent, not as law at all but as a form of ideology.1 Both 
fundamentalists and orientalists have tended to read a determinacy, and even 
an inevitability, into Islamic law that the technical evolvement of the Islamic 
legal tradition hardly sustains. Compounding the problem is the fact that 
generations of scholars have theorized about inherent and unitary 
characteristics of Islamic law throughout its more than fourteen hundred 
years of history without sufficiently being grounded in its various branches, 
historical epochs, and technical micro-discourses. 
Bernard Weiss’s book, The Spirit of Islamic Law, is a good, but not 
entirely effective, antidote to the simplistic and essentialistic works that have 
 * Acting Professor, U.C.L.A. School of Law, The Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished 
Fellow in Islamic Law. I am grateful to Grace, my wife, and Anver Emon for their assistance with this 
essay.  
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 1. See IGNAZ GOLDZIHER, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW 63 (Andras and 
Ruth Hamori trans., 1981). Goldziher argues that acting under the influence of a “theological spirit,” 
Muslim jurists engaged in quibbling discriminations. Id. He goes on to describe Muslim juristic 
activity as marred in “absurd sophistry” and “dreary exegetical trifling.” Id. 
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plagued the field of Islamic legal studies to date. Weiss renders the layperson 
a service by summarizing the historical development and main theoretical 
paradigms of Islamic law. However, Weiss does not manage to avoid entirely 
the misinformed and careless assumptions made by orientalists about Islamic 
law. There is no doubt that Weiss is sensitized against many of the 
unfortunate prejudices that have marked previous Western scholarship in this 
field. Ultimately, however, he tries to reconcile and balance between some of 
the long-held orientalist prejudices about Islamic law and the more careful 
and conscientious recent works. His effort at integrating orientalist 
approaches (which tend to make sweeping generalizations about the nature 
and mechanisms of Islamic law) with the more recent nuanced approaches 
(which tend to ground themselves in the micro-discourses and detailed 
processes of the law) have resulted in a rather hybrid book that suffers from 
significant inconsistencies and confusion. Consequently, Weiss’s book is a 
useful introduction to the Islamic legal tradition, but in some respects, it is 
also a flawed work. 
Weiss does not explain what he means by the “spirit of Islamic law,” and 
whether legal systems actually possess a unitary and coherent spirit. He does 
not explore whether the methodologies, ideological premises, specific 
determinations, institutional structures, or claimed objectives define the spirit 
of a legal system. He does, however, seem to presume that one can find the 
spirit of Islamic law in its avowed jurisprudential theory and not necessarily 
in its actual processes. In order to identify the spirit of Islamic law, Weiss 
focuses on what Muslim jurists claim they are doing rather than what they 
actually end up doing. As discussed below, by paying inadequate attention to 
the microlevel practices of Muslim jurists, it becomes easier to generalize 
Islamic law in ways that ignore its doctrinal and institutional richness. In 
addition, it ends up perpetuating one of the most prevalent orientalist claims 
about Islamic law, which is that Muslim jurists were less interested in the 
actual practice of law than they were in legal theory. In Weiss’s estimation, 
Muslim jurists were preoccupied more with the law as it ought to be than 
they were in the law as actually practiced.2 Weiss does not fully explain the 
basis for this assertion or its implications. However, he does intimate that 
Muslim jurists were more interested in the systematic exposition of the 
theoretical basis for the law than in its practical implementation. This type of 
approach has led prominent orientalists, such as Joseph Schacht, to conclude 
that “[i]t might therefore seem as if it were not correct to speak of an Islamic 
 2. BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 7 (1998). 
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law at all, as if the concept of law did not exist in Islam.”3 Although on 
several occasions Weiss cites Schacht’s arguments as being authoritative, it 
is not clear whether Weiss would agree that Islamic law is so theoretical and 
speculative that it would not qualify as law at all. 
In one of the few occasions in which Weiss explicitly addresses the 
meaning of the spirit of law, he juxtaposes literalist approaches and moralist 
approaches to legal interpretation. Weiss argues that literalism consists of a 
focus on the letter of law, in the sense of focusing on its explicit prohibitions 
and commands of textual sources. Moralism consists of a focus on the 
principles derivable from the same textual sources, sometimes in 
contradiction to the unambiguous pronouncements of the text. But Weiss 
argues, in the case of Islamic law, that the “spirit of the law” did not entail an 
opposition between the spirit and letter. This is because Muslim jurists were 
both moralists and literalists. They derived divinely ordained principles from 
the text, and, according to Weiss, “conformity to the dictates of the texts 
upon which the law is based is an integral part of that juristic mentality that 
we are here calling the ‘spirit of Islamic law.’”4 Hence, Muslim jurists are 
moralists because they adhere to principles, but they also are literalists 
because they base those principles on the literal explications of the text. 
Weiss implies that this type of dynamic between literalism and moralism—
the fidelity to authoritative texts and to the principles derived from those 
texts—is unique to Islamic law, or, at least, not shared by Western law. 
Therefore, unlike Western law, which Weiss contends the writings of St. 
Paul influenced, Islamic law did not differentiate between the spirit and letter 
of the law because for Muslim jurists they were one and the same.5 
Pedagogically, this approach is not helpful because it fails to clarify the 
general role of authority and authoritative texts in legal systems.  
Legal systems are authority bound, and quite often a legal system will 
have a set of texts that it considers authoritative and binding. Jurists 
functioning within a particular legal culture normally do not feel at liberty to 
ignore authoritative texts considered central to that culture. If jurists aim to 
achieve particular normative objectives, they do so by engaging in a 
linguistic practice according to which they creatively interpret or construct 
the meaning of authoritative texts.6 Furthermore, interpretive communities 
 3. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 200 (1964). 
 4. WEISS, supra note 2, at 169. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE AND POWER 
106, 129 (1998) (discussing the linguistic practices of jurists). See generally KHALED ABOU EL FADL, 
REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW (2001) (discussing the creative process underlying the 
formation of Islamic law). 
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form around these authoritative legal texts. These communities create chains 
of authority that bind jurists working within a specific legal culture.7 
Importantly, juristic interpretive communities, as communities of technical 
experts, engage in a variety of roles. They do not simply interpret the text, 
but rather utilize it as a medium in order to accomplish a variety of 
objectives. Jurists engage in social engineering, resolve conflicts, seek to 
establish order and justice, and negotiate with power through the channels of 
authority established within a legal system. Abiding by the channels of 
authority is crucial for the legitimacy of a juristic culture, and necessary if a 
juristic culture will obtain deference from the social or political order in 
which it exists.8  
Considering the centrality of textual authority to all developed legal 
systems, it is difficult to understand Weiss’s point about the spirit and letter 
of the law in the Islamic legal system. All developed legal systems base 
themselves on textual authority, and cumulative interpretive communities 
that develop around certain core texts provide such authority. As such, one 
can examine the determinations of a particular interpretive community at a 
particular point in time and analyze the specific ways in which an interpretive 
community negotiates the text. However, it is an oversimplification to 
contend that Western legal systems differentiate between the spirit and letter 
of the law while the Islamic legal system does not. For instance, it is 
unhelpful to attempt to make a broad statement characterizing whether the 
Jewish law, Common law, or Civil law systems are literalists or not. 
However, scholars have been making such broad and sweeping 
generalizations about Islamic law, and because they have afforded 
inadequate attention to the microdynamics of Muslim jurists, such 
generalizations have gone unchallenged for too long. 
Aside from the failure to explain the intended meaning behind the phrase 
“spirit of the law,” Weiss systematically sets out what he argues are the 
essential features of Islamic law. In the eight chapters of the book, he 
identifies those features as the espousal of divine sovereignty in law. As the 
source of all law and legitimacy, Muslim jurists considered God to be the 
sole sovereign and legislator. Accordingly, Muslim jurists were fixated upon 
sacred texts considered the repositories of divine revelation. Muslim jurists 
also evidenced an uncompromising intentionalist approach to the 
interpretation of these texts. By intentionalist, Weiss means that Muslim 
 7. See generally KHALED ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD’S NAME: ISLAMIC LAW, 
AUTHORITY AND WOMEN (2001) (discussing interpretive communities and Islamic law). 
 8. On the functions of law, see Richard L. Abel, Redirecting Social Studies of Law, 14 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 805 (1980); ABOU EL FADL, supra note 6, at 23-26. 
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jurists focused on investigating the authorial intent behind the sacred text. It 
is the author of the text that determined its meaning, and the job of Muslim 
jurists consisted of discovering the intentions and will of the author. Weiss 
asserts, however, that Muslim jurists frankly acknowledged the uncertainty 
and fallibility of human efforts at capturing the divine intent. As a result, 
Muslim jurists accepted probabilism as the foundation of valid interpretation. 
By probabilism, Weiss means that Muslim jurists accepted that human 
efforts at uncovering the divine intent are imperfect and fallible. Therefore, 
Muslim jurists acknowledged that laws may be based on a probability, and 
not necessarily a certainty, of belief about the correctness of the textual 
interpretations.  
Weiss argues that Muslim jurists were tolerant of legal diversity, and 
were willing to disseminate juristic authority among multiple schools of legal 
thought. Although Muslim jurists were textualists and all authority and 
legitimacy for them derived from the text, they also exhibited a moralistic 
bent grounded in a particular social vision. Weiss does not sufficiently 
elaborate upon this social vision, but he does argue that Muslim jurists 
demonstrated a preoccupation with both defining the limits of the power of 
government and regulating the affairs of private individuals. In this regard, 
Weiss claims that even though Muslim jurists considered the rights of God to 
be coterminous with public interests, they primarily concerned themselves 
with dealing with private individual interactions. Public law, Weiss asserts, 
was considered to be in the service of private law, and “of free human 
interaction regulated by private rights.”9  
Weiss’s detailed discussion on the various characteristics of Islamic law is 
competent and often insightful. His exposition, however, suffers from a 
persistent methodological fallacy that has marred the works of many 
orientalists, termed here “the fallacy of legal exceptionalism.” The fallacy of 
legal exceptionalism is the tendency among scholars to presume that one 
should study and understand Islamic law by exclusive reference to its 
processes and doctrines. This methodological trend does not understand 
Islamic law in the context of general sociologies of law, or by reliance on the 
comparative processes of urban legal systems. Rather, legal exceptionalism 
views the Islamic legal system as an exotic phenomenon that is intrinsically 
and distinctively Islamic. Accordingly, Muslim jurists are not considered 
practitioners in a legal culture, but are thought of as articulators of Islamic 
culture. Muslim jurists are treated as Muslims first and as lawyers second. 
The insights of legal theory or sociology on the functions of law, or the 
 9. WEISS, supra note 2, at 185. 
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characteristics of legal cultures, are treated as irrelevant or non-generalizable 
to the Islamic context. For instance, while the primary preoccupation of 
jurists functioning within a variety of legal systems is the resolution of 
disputes and the establishment of order, this logic is not considered relevant 
to the processes of Islamic law.10 It is as if Muslim juristic culture is 
determined by its unique set of normative ideas and principles rather than by 
identifiable processes of legal systems. The end result of the methodology of 
legal exceptionalism is to make Islamic law somewhat of an oddity in the 
history of legal systems. 
There are various manifestations of the fallacy of legal exceptionalism in 
Weiss’s book. However, I do not wish to overstate the point because Weiss 
does, in fact, avoid many of the orientalist legacies. Weiss’s earlier book on 
Islamic law is one of the most detailed works on Islamic jurisprudential 
theory.11 Furthermore, Weiss is to be commended for avoiding the orientalist 
obsession with the origins of Islamic law. Since the beginning of this century, 
orientalist scholars seem to assume that every Islamic legal institution and 
concept must have been borrowed or co-opted from either Jewish or Roman 
law.12 As if those scholars deem it inconceivable that the Muslim civilization 
could have produced anything original, they presume that Islamic law must 
have depended thoroughly on the intellectual product of non-Islamic 
cultures.13 Blissfully, however, Weiss averts the dogmatic trap of searching 
for the origins of Islamic law, and he deals with Islamic jurisprudence as a 
significant contribution to the intellectual human heritage.  
Unfortunately, Weiss does perpetuate another unfortunate legacy: the 
presumption of mass fabrications. Weiss cites Joseph Schacht and Norman 
Calder in arguing that the great majority of Islamic traditions were fabricated, 
 10. See ALAN WATSON, THE NATURE OF LAW 40-41 (1977) (stating that the primary function of 
law is to resolve conflicts and establish order). 
 11. See BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SEARCH FOR GOD’S LAW: ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE IN THE 
WRITINGS OF SAYF AL-DĪN AL-ĀMIDĪ (1992). For a related collection of articles, see STUDIES IN 
ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY (Bernard G. Weiss ed., 2002).  
 12. See PATRICIA CRONE, ROMAN, PROVINCIAL AND ISLAMIC LAW: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
ISLAMIC PATRONATE 92-93 (1987). Crone states “the Sharī‘a is provincial law recast with Jewish 
concepts at its backbone and numerous Jewish (and other foreign) elements in its substantive 
provisions.” Id. at 93. See also A. J. Wensinck, Die Entstehung der muslimischen 
Reinheitsgesetzgebung, 5 DER ISLAM 1 (1914) (discussing the idea that Islamic law is an amelioration 
of Rabbinic law). For a critique of this thesis, see S.V. Fitzgerald, The Alleged Debt of Islamic to 
Roman Law, 67 L.Q. REV. 81, 81-102 (1951); Wael B. Hallaq, The Use and Abuse of Evidence: The 
Question of Provincial and Roman Influences on Islamic Law, 110 J. ORIENTAL AM. SOC’Y 79, 79-91 
(1990). 
 13. See PATRICIA CRONE & MICHAEL COOK, HAGARISM: THE MAKING OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD 
30-32, 37-38, 180 n.11 (1977); JOSEPH SCHACHT, THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE 
83, 95, 99, 182, 187, 216 (1950) [hereinafter SCHACHT, ORIGINS]; SCHACHT, supra note 3, at 13, 15-
27. 
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presumably by early Muslim jurists or their students.14 Muslim jurists, 
according to Weiss, were strict monotheists who recognized God as the 
source of all authority. The various early schools of Islamic law felt 
increasingly pressured to base their views on divinely inspired textual 
sources. Since God was the source of all authority, personal views or 
customary practices unsupported by divinely inspired text would not suffice 
to establish the legitimacy of the jurists. Consequently, according to 
orientalists, Muslim jurists, in a creative and dialectical process, fabricated a 
large number of traditions, which they then attributed to the Prophet or one of 
the Prophet’s companions.15 Weiss uncritically accepts these speculative 
arguments by orientalists such as Schacht and Calder, and ignores the far 
more nuanced and reasoned studies on this subject by scholars such as Fazlur 
Rahman and Ahmed Hasan.16  
The point is that this long-standing presumption of widespread fabrication 
of traditions reflects the phenomenon that I have described as the fallacy of 
legal exceptionalism. It is highly doubtful that a juristic culture, Islamic or 
not, might engage in the active invention of the textual sources from which it 
derives authority.17 Orientalists, rather incoherently, have maintained that, on 
the one hand, Muslim jurists are strict textualists, as they base all their 
determinations on constructions of the authoritative texts from which they 
derive authority. However, on the other hand, Muslim jurists invented and 
fabricated the texts upon which they base this authority. From a comparative 
perspective, I am not aware of any other urban legal culture that has engaged 
in a similar dynamic of first developing a legal practice, then inventing the 
textual authority for this legal practice and projecting backwards the invented 
texts to the very genesis of the legal system, and then finally adhering strictly 
and literally to the texts that they fabricated. Such odd behavior in the history 
of law ought to be proven using something more systematic than speculative 
textual analysis.18 
 14. WEISS, supra note 2, at 10-13. 
 15. Id. On the widespread fabrication of Islamic legal traditions, see SCHACHT, ORIGINS, supra 
note 13, at 138-89; SCHACHT, supra note 3, at 28-48; GOLDZIHER, supra note 1, at 38-39; N.J. 
COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 42-43, 64-65 (1964). See also NORMAN CALDER, STUDIES IN 
EARLY MUSLIM JURISPRUDENCE 209-14 (1993); JOHN E. WANSBROUGH, QUR’ANIC STUDIES: 
SOURCES AND METHODS OF SCRIPTURAL INTERPRETATION (1977).  
 16. See FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAMIC METHODOLOGY IN HISTORY (1965); AHMAD HASAN, THE 
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (1970). 
 17. See ABOU EL FADL, supra note 7, at 103-10 (arguing that Prophetic traditions are a product 
of a cumulative and evolving authorial enterprise).  
 
 18. For an example of such speculative textual analysis, see CALDER, supra note 15, at 19, 198-
222, 244-47. Weiss, however, describes Calder’s speculations as “seminal.” WEISS, supra note 2, at 
11. For a refutation of Calder’s arguments, see Yasin Dutton, Book Review, 5 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 102 
(1994) (reviewing CALDER, supra note 15). For a refutation of the thesis of mass fabrications, see 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p553 El Fadl book pages .doc  10/15/02   4:01 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
560   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:553 
 
 
 
 
 
At a more basic methodological level, Weiss, following in the steps of 
many earlier scholars, defers too quickly to what Muslim jurists assert about 
their own intentions and processes. As noted above, Weiss sees Muslim 
jurists as strict monotheists who cannot conceive of a source of authority 
other than God. Therefore, Weiss argues that Islamic jurisprudence is 
fundamentally and unequivocally about the search for the divine will as 
revealed in the text. Nonetheless, Weiss recognizes the considerable amount 
of indeterminism in Islamic jurisprudence. In fact, anyone who has done 
research in Islamic jurisprudence is struck by the enormous diversity of 
juristic opinions on nearly every major and minor point of law. Ignaz 
Goldziher, the prominent Western orientalist, considered this as evidence of 
sophistry and pedantic quibbling among Muslim jurists.19 It would seem, 
however, that this indeterminacy and willingness to engage in speculative 
exercises is inconsistent with the avowed intentionalist orientation of Muslim 
jurists. However, Weiss does not believe so because in the most fundamental 
sense Muslim jurists were searching for the divine will. Muslim jurists 
realized that, in most cases, one cannot discover the divine will with a level 
of certainty, and, as a result, they contented themselves with the probabilities.  
Essentially, Weiss is correct, but this intentionalist orientation, quite 
popular with Western orientalists and Muslim fundamentalists, is not all that 
helpful in understanding the actual processes of Islamic law. As noted above, 
legal systems, by their very nature, are authority-bound, and it is a rare jurist 
indeed who would claim to rely on his unfettered discretion in expounding 
the law. Regardless of whether jurists claim to rely on the will of God, the 
original intent of the founding fathers, the will of the people, custom or habit, 
or the indisputable dictates of reason, they search for an authority higher than 
themselves.20 Interestingly, as Weiss recognizes, Muslim jurists often 
considered the legal precedents of their juristic predecessors to be dispositive 
authority.21 In fact, the explicit or implicit reliance on the practice and prior 
determinations of jurists is a common feature of legal systems.22 Weiss 
MOHAMMAD MUSTAFA AZAMI, STUDIES IN EARLY HADITH LITERATURE (1968); IFTIKHAR ZAMAN, 
THE EVOLUTION OF A HADITH: TRANSMISSION, GROWTH, AND THE SCIENCE OF RIJAL IN A HADITH OF 
SA’D B. ABI WAQQAS (1991). 
 19. In reality, the reliance on hypotheticals and speculative thought is a common characteristic of 
all the major legal systems of the world. See Alan Watson & Khaled Abou El Fadl, Fox Hunting, 
Pheasant Shooting, and Comparative Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2000). 
 20. See ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 117 (1985). 
 21. WEISS, supra note 2, at 136. Weiss acknowledges Sherman Jackson’s work, which 
persuasively establishes this point. See SHERMAN JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHĀB AL-DĪN AL-QARĀFĪ 69-96 (1996). 
 22. See generally YASIN DUTTON, THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC LAW: THE QUR’AN, THE 
MUWATTA’ AND MADINAN ‘AMAL (1999) (stating that the actions of men (‘amal) preserved the true 
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acknowledges that Muslim jurists most often would rely on and interpret 
juristic precedent within their legal school of thought instead of relying on de 
novo interpretations of the original sources of law.23 Consequently, the 
question is: Considering the role of precedents and the reliance on 
cumulative communities of legal interpretation, how meaningful is the claim 
of juristic intentionalism? 
In this regard, one should keep several points in mind. Although Weiss 
does not mention this fact, there was an explicit debate in early Islam on the 
issue of God’s sovereignty. This was known as the hakimiyyah debate 
between a seditious group known as the Khawarij, and the factions 
supporting Ali b. Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and the fourth Muslim 
Caliph. The Khawarij rebelled against Ali, accusing him, among other things, 
of compromising God’s sovereignty by accepting arbitration that was 
supposed to resolve a political dispute between Ali and his opponents. The 
Khawarij contended that God’s sovereignty would be meaningless unless 
God’s will is both determinable and effective, while Ali argued that humans 
were responsible for mediating the assertion of God’s sovereignty. The 
efforts of human beings are to be considered their best efforts, but such 
efforts are not conterminous with the sovereign will of God.24  
Partly due to this earlier theological schism between Ali and the 
Khawarij, Muslim jurists do not focus on the hakimiyyah debate in their 
works of jurisprudence. Rather, as Weiss recognizes, they divide into two 
main camps. The first camp, the mukhatti’ah, argues that on most 
jurisprudential issues, jurists will be rewarded for their best efforts. In the 
Hereafter, those who have managed to discover the divine will be rewarded 
more generously than those who, despite their best efforts, failed to do so. 
Ultimately, however, both those who discover the divine will and those who 
fail to do so will receive the bliss of God if they did the best they could with 
the available evidence. The second camp, the musawwibah, argues that there 
are no correct answers to most jurisprudential issues. God’s will is simply 
that people exert an effort in studying the law; ultimately, however, He wills 
for people to act according to what they individually believe to be the truth in 
jurisprudential matters. In that sense, the will of God is contingent on the best 
efforts and sincerity of belief on the part of each individual jurist. According 
to the musawwibah, God’s law is relative because the divine will is 
expression of Islamic law).  
 23. See WEISS, supra note 2, at 114-18. The original sources of law were the Qur’an and the 
traditions of the Prophet and his companions. 
 24. See ABOU EL FADL, supra note 7, at 23-24.  
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contingent on the human will.25  
The other significant point to consider in this regard is that Weiss does 
not deal with a variety of elements of indeterminacy in Islamic law, such as 
custom (‘urf), public interest (maslahah), or equity (istislah), and he does not 
give adequate attention to the elements of tarjih (the various factors that 
jurists consider in weighing the evidence before reaching a legal 
determination).26 Although custom, public interest, and equity could be 
extratextual sources of law, Muslim jurists often used the text as a hook in 
the pursuit of these goals. As Weiss explains, Muslim jurists considered the 
ultimate objectives of the law in determining the mandates of the text. The 
text did not constrain the maneuverability of Islamic law, not only because 
Muslim jurists were skilled interpreters of the text, but also because the 
relevant textual sources were numerous and complex. As Weiss concedes, 
“the textual landscape [of Islamic law] was not only vast but 
indeterminate.”27 
The indeterminacy and vastness of Islamic text, and the numerous 
interpretive methods utilized by Muslim jurists in the construction of 
meaning, should put the notion of intentionalism in the proper perspective. 
Participants in technical juristic cultures will purport to represent the will of 
the legislator, the sovereign, the forefathers, or the well-established principles 
of justice. These, however, are part of the symbolism of authority in law, and 
the technique of a juristic linguistic practice. Whether in fact there is any 
sublime will being uncovered in the process of legal interpretation is a 
different matter altogether. Put differently, Muslim jurists, like most jurists in 
any legal culture, do claim that they are uncovering the will of an authority 
higher than themselves. Even when the will being discovered is that of God, 
the intervention of legal precedents, interpretation, and hermeneutics and the 
utilization of discretion in the interpretive process add layers of complexity to 
the claim of intentionalism. It is an oversimplification to think of Islamic law 
 25. See WEISS, supra note 2, at 117-21. Weiss refers to the musawwibah school of thought as 
“the infallibilists,” but he does not explore the implications of their arguments about the divine will. 
See ABOU EL FADL, supra note 7, at 148-50. Peculiarly, Weiss contends that Muslim jurists considered 
the divine will to be no less discoverable than the intent of a human author or speaker. WEISS, supra 
note 2, at 58, 64. 
 26. See Ihsan Abdul-Wajid Baghby, Utility in Classical Islamic Law: The Concept of ‘Maslahah’ 
in ‘Usul al-Fiqh’ (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with 
author); John Makdisi, Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 63 (1985); 
MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 245-96 (1991); Felicitas 
Opwis, Maslaha: An Intellectual History of a Core Concept of Islamic Legal Theory (2001) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author); ABOU EL FADL, supra note 7, 
at 37-47; WAEL B. HALLAQ, AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC LAW 127-32 (2001); 
WEISS, supra note 11, at 729-38. 
 
 27. WEISS, supra note 2, at 110. 
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as an indefatigable search for God’s will. Perhaps the divine will is the stated 
aspiration of Muslim jurists, but that does not mean that this aspirational 
foundation can explain the actual processes and dynamics of Islamic law. For 
instance, numerous justices that once sat on the U.S. Supreme Court have 
claimed that they implemented the original intent behind the text of the 
Constitution. It would be rather simplistic, however, to attempt to describe 
the development of U.S. constitutional law as a protracted intentionalist 
exercise. 
At times, the fallacy of legal exceptionalism has contributed to some of 
the most incoherent assumptions about Islamic law. Frankly, these 
assumptions appear at times to be the product of social biases inherited from 
the Age of Colonialism, when scholars attached to the colonial forces 
presumed Islamic law to be primitive, impractical, and unworkable, and 
therefore, replaceable by more so-called progressive legal systems.28 One of 
the most trenchant biases is the belief that Islamic law was idealistic, and that 
Muslim jurists were interested more in the law as it ought to be than as 
practiced.29 In evaluation of an orientalist such as Schacht, Islamic law 
represented “an extreme case of jurists’ law.” Muslim jurists were not 
motivated by juridical technique or by the needs of practice. Rather, the 
primary motivation for Muslim jurists was religious zeal, which tempted 
Muslim jurists to engage in speculative explorations into the will of God.30 
Due to its idealistic and moralistic character, Islamic law ultimately was 
unworkable. It remained theoretical, impractical, and perhaps even a 
sociological failure. For example, Schacht, whom Weiss cites approvingly 
throughout his book, not only concludes that Islamic law is not law at all, as 
noted above, but even suggests that as a legal system it is not workable for 
modern lawyers.31 According to both Schacht and Weiss, Islamic law 
possesses a pronounced individualistic and private character.32 Muslim jurists 
were concerned primarily with the resolution of private disputes. As part of 
this paradigm, Islamic criminal law remained largely private in character. 
The family of the victim had the right of tallion, but there were no crimes 
against society. After explaining that Muslim juristic thinking does not 
 28. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978); BRYAN S. TURNER, ORIENTALISM, 
POSTMODERNISM AND GLOBALISM (1994). 
 29. WEISS, supra note 2, at 7. 
 30. SCHACHT, supra note 3, at 209. 
 31. Schacht states, “[Islamic law] has, therefore, not easily lent itself to the technical treatment 
applied to it by modern lawyers in the majority of contemporary Islamic states.” Id. at 4. Weiss states 
that “we cannot automatically equate the rules of the Shari‘a [Islamic law] with law.” WEISS, supra 
note 2, at 20. 
 32. See SCHACHT, supra note 3, at 4; WEISS, supra note 2, at 184-85. 
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understand the concept of a corporate person, and does not regard the state or 
its people as legal entities, Weiss asserts the following: “Strictly speaking, 
the concept of crime as understood in Western societies does not exist in 
their thinking. There is no such thing as an offense against the state or against 
society, since these have no status in the law.”33 Nevertheless, Weiss notes 
that Muslim jurists were concerned with limiting the power of the state in 
relation to its subjects, but they did so primarily by addressing private 
concerns. In doing so, Muslim jurists believed that they could keep the state 
within its divinely ordained limits.34 
These various generalizations about Islamic law and the practice of 
Muslim jurists are not based on any microlevel sociological studies. 
Furthermore, these generalizations amount to the implication that Islamic law 
is a primitive legal system. As A. S. Diamond pointed out years ago, since 
the works of Maine on ancient law, a widespread misconception that pre-
modern legal systems did not distinguish between crimes and civil injuries 
has existed. However, as Diamond has noted, this distinction may be 
perennial, but it was not always easily observable.35  
The irony, however, is that Muslim jurists explicitly state that in cases of 
intentional injuries the rights of the state are not contingent on the rights of 
the individual. For instance, the family of a murder victim can demand 
punishment or compensation, or the family may simply forgive the 
perpetrator. Nevertheless, if the family of the victim chooses compensation 
or forgiveness, the state still may impose a separate punishment on the 
perpetrator in defense of the rights of the public.36 In addition, there are 
crimes such as hirabah (banditry and highway robbery) that, by definition, 
the law considers crimes against society. The state does not give the victim of 
such a crime the option to forgive or demand compensation, and the state 
must punish the perpetrator.37 In addition, Islamic legal literature is replete 
with treatises on the laws of taxation, the regulation of public works and 
trusts, and administrative law.  
However, there is a much more basic issue implicated here. Orientalist 
scholars consistently have employed the distinction between private and 
public law as if this division is natural and self-evident. For example, not a 
single orientalist has attempted to define this distinction by reference to 
 33. WEISS, supra note 2, at 181. Schacht makes the same point. See SCHACHT, supra note 3, at 
187. 
 34. See WEISS, supra note 2, at 183. 
 35. See A. S. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW 279-80 (1935). 
 36. See IBN RUSHD, BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID WA NIHAYAT AL-MUQTASID 724 (1999); 1 ‘ABD 
AL-QADIR ‘UUDAH, AL-TASHRI’ AL-JINA’I AL-ISLAMI 774-76. 
 37. See id. at 763-67; ABOU EL FADL, supra note 6, at 131-38.  
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general works on jurisprudence. In reality, however, the distinction is subtle, 
difficult, and, in the opinion of some jurists, indefensible. Historically, while 
the Roman and Civil law systems differentiated between public and private 
affairs, the Common Law system did not, except perhaps in the case of 
crimes against the majesty, which the Common Law system considered 
treasonous.38 Nevertheless, one suspects that orientalists are not making a 
jurisprudential point, but rather a cultural one. Orientalists seem to labor 
under cultural assumptions about the development of Muslim societies. 
Purportedly, Muslim societies have not developed at-large ways of thinking 
about the state or society. The very notions of citizenry, human legislation, or 
fictional legal entities, such as corporations, were absent from Muslim 
thinking as if strong monotheistic belief prevented the development of the 
political notion of the state. Purportedly, Muslims thought of the members of 
society, first and foremost, as God’s faithful subjects. Presumably, people 
may have interacted with each other in their individual capacity, but the only 
thing that united them as a collectivity was their relationship to God.39 
Importantly, these cultural assumptions are at the heart of the notion of 
oriental despotism, or what at times has been called sultanistic regimes.40 
This is not the place to analyze the concept of oriental despotism, but it is 
important to note that these socio-historical biases do tend to distract from 
microlevel examinations of the actual practices of Islamic law, and intend to 
support fallacies of legal exceptionalism. Even more, the habit of legal 
exceptionalism forces orientalist scholars into intellectually forced positions. 
Effectively, Islamic law is read in such a way as to confirm the cultural 
suppositions about Muslim religious thinking. For instance, as already noted 
above, Weiss and others argue that Muslim jurists were idealistic, moralistic, 
and often speculative.41 According to Weiss, Muslim jurists made law for the 
Hereafter. In Weiss’s words: “The fundamental preoccupation of Muslim 
 38. See THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 366-70 (1937); JULIUS 
STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 103-4, 491-92 (2d prtg. 1950). 
 39. See WEISS, supra note 2, at 159 (arguing that Islamic law does not know the concept of the 
corporate person); SCHACHT, supra note 3, at 206 (arguing that the whole concept of institutions is 
absent in Islamic law); BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG?: WESTERN IMPACT AND MIDDLE 
EASTERN RESPONSE 111 (2002) (arguing that unlike Roman law, Islamic law did not recognize the 
concept of corporate legal persons); GEORGE MAKDISI, THE RISE OF COLLEGES: INSTITUTIONS OF 
LEARNING IN ISLAM AND THE WEST 224 (1981) (arguing that the corporate concept of the medieval 
European university could not have come from the Muslim world because Islamic thought lacks the 
notion of a corporate person); BERNARD LEWIS, THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE OF ISLAM 63 (1988) 
[hereinafter LEWIS, POLITICAL LANGUAGE] (arguing that there is no concept of citizenship in Islam). 
 40. See generally PATRICIA SPRINGBORG, WESTERN REPUBLICANISM AND THE ORIENTAL 
PRINCE 18-20 (1992); KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
TOTAL POWER (1957); SULTANISTIC REGIMES (H.E. Chehabi & Juan J. Linz eds., 1998).  
 41. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31. 
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thinking about the Shari‘a is with duties that human beings have toward God 
and with sanctions that belong to the world to come, not to this world.”42 
This claim is consistent with the tendency to think of Islamic law as a 
moralistic and theoretical discourse rather than actual law. Weiss does cite 
the works of scholars such as David Powers, Sherman Jackson, and Baber 
Johansen on the practice of Islamic law, as well as the active dynamics 
between Muslim jurists and social realities, but he does not explore the 
implications of these studies adequately.43 
Interestingly, Weiss recognizes that Muslim jurists often differentiated 
between the legal consequences of an act on this earth and the results in the 
Hereafter. Some legal acts could be valid, although ultimately considered 
sinful in the eyes of God, and some acts legally are invalid even if they are 
lawful in the eyes of God. The division between the temporal and divine 
consequences of legal acts is one of the most salient features of classical 
Islamic jurisprudence. This was treated partly as a matter of jurisdiction; the 
state and its courts did not possess jurisdiction to punish every sinful act.44 
Certain sinful behavior such as acts of sexual immodesty or lewdness, short 
of adultery or fornication, or fraud or duress in contracts and transactions, 
short of actual theft, were left to the discretion of the human legislator to 
punish or not. Courts, however, do not have jurisdiction to punish the failure 
to pray or perform pilgrimage to Mecca.45 Furthermore, abusing the power of 
divorce or using God’s name in vain were considered sinful acts, but the state 
did not possess the power to punish them.46  
 42. WEISS, supra note 2, at 20. 
 43. For reasons that are not clear to me, Weiss does not discuss the influential studies of Wael 
Hallaq on Islamic law. See generally HALLAQ, supra note 26; WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF 
ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNĪ USŪL AL-FIQH (1997); WAEL B. HALLAQ, 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN CLASSICAL AND MEDIEVAL ISLAM (1995). 
 44. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, AND GOD KNOWS THE SOLDIERS: THE AUTHORITATIVE AND 
AUTHORITARIAN IN ISLAMIC DISCOURSES 88 (2001); ABOU EL FADL, supra note 7, at 149-50. 
 45. Muslim jurists argued that the only exception is if the failure to pray or perform other 
religious rites constitutes an act of apostasy. Apostasy is a technical legal category with specified 
elements. The crime of apostasy is established when a Muslim converts to another religion or denies 
one of the fundamental precepts of the Islamic faith. In classical jurisprudence, the offender is given 
three nights and days to repent, and if he/she does not, he/she will be executed. Repentance is 
accomplished by repeating the testament of faith, stating that there is no God but God, and that 
Muhammad is the Prophet of God. According to the majority view, if the offender pronounces the 
testament of faith, no further proceedings are permissible against him/her and the offender must be 
released. See 2 ‘ABD AL-QADIR ‘UUDAH, AL-TASHRI’ AL-JINA’I 706-31. See also MOHAMED S. EL-
AWA, PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW 49-58, 61-64 (1982) (discussing the classical law of apostasy and 
arguing that the classical position is not supported by the Qur’an, and therefore should be abrogated in 
the modern age). 
 46. Interestingly, modern Islamic puritans or fundamentalists eradicate the distinction between 
the temporal and divine, and seem to empower the state to punish all sinful acts. 
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The essential point here is that what orientalists often describe as 
idealistic or speculative thought is a common feature of all legal systems.47 
Meanwhile, Muslim juristic thought exhibits a technical legalism and realism 
that is the earmark of a functioning and socially-engaged legal system. The 
fact that Islamic law did not develop institutions that mimic the development 
of the Roman and Civil legal systems cannot support a claim of 
exceptionalism. In fact, as is the case with most systems of law over matters 
related to jurisdiction over legal acts, Muslim jurists revealed a preoccupation 
with the temporal consequences, often to the exclusion of the sacred.48 
Part of the legacy of the presupposition of oriental despotism is the long-
held belief that Muslim jurists were realists in one important regard: their 
recognition of despotic governments. Accordingly, orientalists often contend 
that Muslim jurists legitimated despotism and recognized the ruler as having 
the right to demand absolute obedience from his subjects in all matters that 
did not involve a direct violation of God’s divine command. In the words of 
Weiss: “[Muslim jurists] were all, almost without exception, political 
conservatives and upholders of the status quo, even to the extent of regarding 
tyranny as better than revolution.”49 Therefore, according to the prevailing 
orientalist paradigm, Muslim jurists were idealists and moralists, but not 
when it came to recognizing tyranny. Here they were realists in the most 
vulgar sense of the word. In fact, there is an extended amount of literature 
emphasizing that Muslim jurists legitimated the usurpation of power, 
accepted most forms of despotism, and were political quietists.50 I have 
 47. See Watson & Abou El Fadl, supra note 19, at 3-35; ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, 
LEGAL CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY, at xiii (1984). 
 48. Schacht seems to have noticed that Islamic law is often technical and formalistic, and that 
this aspect often trumps vague moral standards such as fairness, justice, and truth. Surprisingly, 
though, Schacht ascribes this to the fact that Muslim jurists were interested in providing “concrete and 
material standards” and not “formal rules on the play of contending interests, which is the aim of 
secular laws.” SCHACHT, supra note 3, at 203-4. Schacht is confused by the fact that Muslim jurists act 
like lawyers instead of moral philosophers, but instead of acknowledging this fact, he pronounces a 
distinction between concrete material standards and formal rules for contending interests. This 
distinction is not only unknown to jurisprudence, but it also is entirely incoherent. Schacht seems to 
confuse substantive laws with rules of procedure. Interestingly, he accuses Muslim jurists of mixing 
substantive law with rules of procedure because, according to him, Muslim jurists did not understand 
the difference. Id. at 188-98. Schacht, however, ignores the fact that rules of procedure differ from one 
historical period to another, and from one legal jurisdiction to another. In legal hornbooks, Muslim 
jurists make passing reference to laws of procedure, but their main goal is to elucidate substantive law. 
Books on administrative law often set out rules of procedure.  
 49. WEISS, supra note 2, at 178.  
 50. See H.A.R. Gibb, Constitutional Organization, in 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 3-27 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955); ANN K.S. 
LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEORY: THE JURISTS 242-63 (1981); HANNA MIKHAIL, POLITICS AND 
REVELATION: MĀWARDĪ AND AFTER (1995); LEWIS, POLITICAL LANGUAGE, supra note 39, at 91, 
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challenged already the coherence of this view in an extensive study on 
Muslim juridical discourses on rebellion.51 The belief that Muslim jurists 
legitimated tyranny and forbade all forms of rebellion is defensible only if 
one ignores the actual micro-discourses of Muslim jurists. In addition, once 
again, this long-held view regarding Muslim juristic discourses is a direct 
product of legal exceptionalism. It ignores the comparative discourses of 
other legal cultures and the details of juristic practice in relation to the 
sociological function of legal orders.  
Other than the issue of obedience to rulers, Weiss seems to believe that 
despotism and hierarchies of power are a pervasive aspect of Islamic law. 
Reasonably enough, Weiss argues that classical Islamic law is patriarchal in 
nature in that it considers the men to be the head of their families and expects 
them to be the providers, protectors, and leaders. Weiss, however, goes 
further than the mere recognition that all legal systems, including Islamic, are 
patriarchal and biased towards men. In a surprising statement, he argues as 
follows:  
Only the patriarchal extended family can function with optimal 
effectiveness as the cradle and safe haven of human life. Any 
restructuring of the family along other lines can be said most 
assuredly to be contrary to the spirit of Islamic law. Family life 
requires a hierarchy in which females and children are under the 
authority of males, although males must exercise that authority 
responsibly and with kindness.52  
This statement brings us full circle to the ambiguity surrounding the 
notion of the “spirit of Islamic law.” One could interpret Weiss to be making 
a normative argument—any attempt at effecting family law reform so as to 
alter the relations of patriarchy is a violation of the spirit of Islamic law. 
Alternatively, one could interpret him to be making a descriptive argument—
Muslim jurists would consider any attempt at restructuring the family to be a 
violation. However, if the statement is descriptive, then it is puzzling. 
Muslim jurists did not talk in terms of the spirit of Islamic law, and there are 
aspects of Islamic family law that one would consider under modern 
101-02; Michael Cook, Activism and Quietism in Islam: The Case of the Early Murji’a, in ISLAM AND 
POWER 21-22 (Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki eds., 1981). 
 51. See generally ABOU EL FADL, supra note 6. Hanna Mikhail raised questions about the 
soundness of the accepted Western position regarding Islamic political thought. See MIKHAIL, supra 
note 50, at 15-56. More recently, Azami challenged this position from a historical perspective. See 
AZIZ AL-AZMEH, MUSLIM KINGSHIP: POWER AND THE SACRED IN MUSLIM, CHRISTIAN, AND PAGAN 
POLITIES (1997).  
 52. WEISS, supra note 2, at 153 (emphasis added). 
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standards to be quite liberal.53 It seems, however, that Weiss sees a coherence 
in the social vision of Muslim jurists that they faithfully and persistently 
served.54 Unfortunately, this social vision was both patriarchal and despotic. 
One must wonder, however, if the so-called spirit of Islamic law is part of a 
projected image of oriental societies that reflects the belief system of Western 
scholars, or if it is a genuine spirit that Muslim jurists endorsed. 
Weiss’s book reflects several other misconceptions about Islamic law that 
are worth noting. Weiss assumes that Islamic law mandates the segregation 
of the sexes,55 that women should remain at home at all times, and that 
women should not venture outside, unless they receive permission from their 
husbands and are in the company of a male relative.56 In the field of ritual, 
Weiss assumes that according to Islamic law, all commercial establishments 
must be closed down during Friday services, and that the state has the 
obligation, or duty, to force males to attend the Friday congregational 
prayers.57 Both of these assumptions are consistent with what Weiss contends 
is the social vision of Muslim jurists. Nonetheless, the necessity of forbidding 
the mixing of the sexes in public forums is contested in Islamic sources 
partly because the Prophet’s community was not segregated.58 In addition, 
Muslim jurists disagreed on whether the law required a male relative to 
chaperone a woman when traveling out of her town. The vast majority of 
jurists did not claim that a woman needs a chaperone simply when leaving 
her home.59 Similarly, while Muslim jurists did debate whether a contract of 
sale concluded after the call for congregational prayer on Fridays is valid, it 
is presumptuous to contend that the state had the power to compel Muslims 
 53. For instance, a large number of Muslim jurists held that a woman may insert conditions in 
her marriage contract that state that she does not have to do housework, may divorce herself if her 
husband raises his voice to her, may have an equal power of divorce to that of her husband, or does not 
have to obey her husband. TAQI AL-DIN AHMAD IBN ‘ABD AL-HALIM IBN TAYMIYYA, 29 MAJMU’ 
FATAWA 126-38, 145-76, 342-53 (‘Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad b. Qasim al-‘Asimi ed.) 
[hereinafter 29 MAJMU’ FATAWA]; TAQI AL-DIN AHMAD IBN ‘ABD AL-HALIM IBN TAYMIYYA, 32 
MAJMU’ FATAWA 157-70 (‘Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad b. Qasim al-‘Asimi ed.); 3 ABU AL-WALID 
MUHAMMAD IBN RUSHD, AL-BAYAN WA AL-TAHSIL 7-10, 29, 35-36, 45, 100-01, 108, 138, 263, 386-
95, 313-18, 327, 334-36, 395-96, 402-07, 432-36, 440-47, 477-82 (Muhammad al-‘Arayashi ed., 
1984). 
 54. Weiss states: “The Muslim jurists were animated by a social vision that they firmly believed 
to be of divine provenance and that they saw the law as always serving.” WEISS, supra note 2, at 146. 
It is rather essentialistic to talk about a social vision that all Muslim jurists had regardless of time, 
place, and school of thought that persisted over a span of more than fourteen hundred years. 
 55. Id. at 185. 
 56. Id. at 157. 
 57. Id. at 149, 185. 
 58. See ABOU EL FADL, supra note 7, at 190-92, 232-47; ‘ABD AL-KARIM ZAIDAN, AL-
MUFASSAL FI AHKAM AL-MAR’AH WA AL-BAYT AL-MUSLIM FI AL-SHARI’AH AL-ISLAMIYYAH (1994).  
 59. ABOU EL FADL, supra note 7, at 183-85.  
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to attend services. In the modern age, a few Muslim countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, do enforce strict segregation of the sexes, and do compel men to 
attend congregational prayers, but it is telling that these laws are not put into 
effect in most Muslim countries.60 The reality is that the legal and 
sociological practices of Muslims are more complex than the social visions 
that Western scholars tend to project onto them. 
Other misconceptions in Weiss’s book relate to the presumed world 
vision of Muslim jurists. According to the received wisdom of much Western 
and Muslim contemporary scholarship, Muslim jurists divided the world into 
two abodes, the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the abode of war (dar al-
harb). The abode of Islam is where Muslims hold the reins of power and the 
government is Islamic. The rest of the world is considered the abode of war. 
Muslims may enter into temporary peace agreements with non-Muslims, but 
ultimately Muslims must fight the unbelievers until Islam is supreme around 
the world.61 This doctrine long has captured the imagination of orientalist 
scholars, being projected as a core part of the Muslim worldview. 
Nonetheless, the actual linguistic practice of Muslim jurists seriously 
challenges this paradigm. For one, Muslim jurists could not agree on the 
definitions of the abodes of either Islam or non-Muslims. The end result was 
that Muslim jurists used the abode of Islam as a loose category to signify 
territories that belong to Muslims.  
However, Muslim jurists did not speak simply of the abode of Islam 
versus the abode of war, but rather of a multitude of abodes. They often 
spoke of the abode of faith, the abode of justice, the abode of safety, the 
abode of suspended judgment, the abode of treaty, the abode of non-
belligerence, and others. All of these abodes reflected a variety of normative 
judgments about the moral worth and political status of a variety of polities 
and territories that Muslim jurists encountered at different times. In fact, 
according to Muslim jurists, non-Muslims could rule some territories and 
those territories still would be considered part of the abode of Islam.62 
 60. Most Muslim juristic sources discuss whether congregational Friday prayers are obligatory 
for adult males, and under what circumstances. However, the simple fact that an act is mandated 
before God does not mean that the state has the power to enforce it in the temporal life. See ABD AL-
RAHMAN AL-JAZIRI, KITAB AL-FIQH ‘ALA AL-MADHAHIB AL-ARBA’AH 395-96 (Ibrahim Muhammad 
Ramadan ed., Beirut 1993) (1928); MUHAMMAD JAWAD MUGHNIYAH, AL-FIQH ‘ALA AL-MADHAHIB 
AL-KHAMSA 120 (1992). 
 61. WEISS, supra note 2, at 149-51. See also LEWIS, POLITICAL LANGUAGE, supra note 39, at 73; 
MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 62-66 (1955).  
 62. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim 
Minorities from the 2nd/8th to the 11th/17th Centuries, 1 J. ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 141, 144-57 (1994); 
Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Use and Abuse of “Holy War,” 14 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 133, 136-37 
(2000) [hereinafter Abou El Fadl, Use and Abuse]. 
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Furthermore, Muslim jurists disagreed on what constitutes a just cause for 
fighting non-Muslims. Some jurists argued that Muslims fight non-Muslims 
simply because they are non-Muslims, and therefore, in principle, they ought 
to be fought until they either convert or submit to Muslim sovereignty. Other 
jurists argued, however, that Muslims should fight non-Muslims only if they 
pose a danger to Muslims. Consequently, if non-Muslims are non-belligerent 
towards Muslims, Muslims ought not to fight them.63  
In addition, the status of treaties with non-Muslims is rather complex. The 
practice of entering into permanent treaties of any kind is a fairly modern 
phenomenon. Pre-modern nations typically entered into treaties limited to a 
term of years, and even many of the contemporary bilateral treaties possess 
fixed terms of ninety-nine years. Surprisingly, however, many of the 
medieval Muslim jurists held that treaties ought to have maximum terms of 
ten years but that parties may renew treaties indefinitely for ten-year 
increments. A large number of jurists argued that a peace treaty may be of 
any duration as long as it contains sufficient conditions guaranteeing the 
well-being and safety of Muslims. Others, such as Ibn Taymiyya, challenged 
the basis for the ten-year limit doctrine arguing that treaties may in fact be 
indefinite or permanent.64 These various doctrinal complexities are a function 
of the fact that the Muslim world view, like the Muslim social view, was 
diverse, evolving, and non-essential. 
Bernard Weiss is one of the most accomplished and influential scholars of 
Islamic law in the West. Considering the state of the field of Islamic law, The 
Spirit of Islamic Law is one of the best available introductions to the subject. 
In many ways, the difficulties one encounters in the book are not Weiss’s. 
These difficulties say much more about the state of the field of Islamic legal 
studies than about Weiss’s work. For too long, orientalists treated Islamic 
law as an exception to the field of legal studies, and avoided comparative 
approaches to Muslim juristic discourses. In addition, there has been a long-
established tradition of ignoring the microlevel dynamics and linguistic 
practices of Islamic law, and projecting onto Islamic law presumed social 
 63. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources, 89 
MUSLIM WORLD 144, 152 (1999); Abou El Fadl, Use and Abuse, supra note 62, at 137-38. 
 64. See 29 MAJMU’ FATAWA, supra note 53, at 140-41. See also ABU BAKR AL-QAFFAL AL-
MARWAZI, HILYAT AL-’ULAMA’ FI MA’RIFAT MADHAHIB AL-FUQAHA’ 718-21 (1988); 1 ABU AL-
HASAN AL-MARGHINANI, AL-HIDAYAH: SHARH BIDAYAT AL-MUBTADI 138-39 (1975); 3 ABU ISHAQ 
BURHAN IBN MUFLIH, AL-MUBDI’ FI SHARH AL-MUQNI’ 398-99 (‘Ali b. ‘Abd Allah Al Thani ed., 
1973); 14 ABU AL-HASAN AL-MAWARDI, AL-HAWI AL-KABIR FI FIQH MADHHAB AL-IMAM AL-SHAFI’I 
352-53 (‘Ali Muhammad Mu’awwad & ‘Adil Ahmad ‘Abd al-Mawjud eds., 1994); 8 SHAMS AL-DIN 
AL-RAMLI, NIHAYAT AL-MUHTAJ ILA SHARH AL-MINHAJ 107 (3d ed. 1992); 8 ABU MUHAMMAD IBN 
QUDAMAH, AL-MUGHNI 460-61 (Dar al-Kitab al-’Arabi 1983); 3 SHAMS AL-DIN AL-SARAKHSI, 
SHARH KITAB AL-SIYAR AL-KABIR 46-47 (Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad Hasan Isma’il ed., 1997). 
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visions or world views.  
In reality, however, these social visions and world views tell us much 
more about the cultural assumptions of Western scholars regarding the exotic 
other than they tell us about the culture of Muslim jurists. This insistence on 
finding a so-called Muslim worldview that permeates the minds and 
consciousness of all Muslims, including Muslim jurists, has resulted in 
assertions that are essentialistic and contradictory. Therefore, Muslim jurists 
are described simultaneously as moralists and idealists and, consequently, as 
conservative realists. Muslim jurists are intentionalists wedded to the divine 
will and text, but Islamic law is indeterminate and speculative. Muslim jurists 
were staunch monotheists who believed in submission to God, but they also 
favored absolute obedience to temporal rules. Muslim jurists were text-
bound, confined by divine texts that defined their world view, but Muslims 
either fabricated these texts or borrowed them from Jews and Romans. To 
make things worse, Muslim jurists had no conception of crime, public 
offenses, public law, constitutional jurisprudence, or corporate legal entities, 
and they labored under a world view that was unrelentingly belligerent 
toward the outside world.  
Although few modern orientalists will concede the point openly, the basic 
impetus seems to be the desire to explain the spirit of the failure of Islamic 
law. It is as if orientalists presume that Islamic law was a failed experiment, 
and then proceed to investigate the ways that Islamic law must differ from 
Western law. However, due to the practice of legal exceptionalism, they fail 
to understand the microdynamics of Islamic law, and, for that matter, 
Western law.  
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